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Imaginary Companions in Childhood: Relations to
Imagination Skills and Autobiographical Memory in Adults
Lucy Firth, Ben Alderson-Day, Natalie Woods, and Charles Fernyhough
Department of Psychology, Durham University, Durham, UK
The presence of a childhood imaginary companion (IC) has been proposed to reﬂect
heightened imaginative abilities. This study hypothesized that adults who reported hav-
ing a childhood IC would score higher on a task requiring the imaginative construction
of visual scenes. Additionally, it was proposed that individuals who produced more
vivid and detailed scenes would also report richer autobiographical memories, due to
a shared reliance on imaginative abilities in construction and recollection. Sixty parti-
cipants (20 with an IC), completed an adapted scene construction procedure and an
autobiographical memory questionnaire. Participants reporting a childhood IC scored
signiﬁcantly higher on scene construction and rated themselves as more imaginative.
Scene construction scores were also moderately related to the richness of autobiographi-
cal memories, although this was almost entirely due to scores on the thought=emotion=
action component of scene construction. Autobiographical memory was unrelated to the
presence of an IC. Implications for overlapping and dissociable aspects of imagination
and memory are discussed.
Imaginary companions (ICs) in childhood are a
common occurrence (McLewin & Muller, 2006). ICs
are typically reported in 10%–30% of participants in
studies with children (Bouldin & Pratt, 2001; Davis,
Meins, & Fernyhough, 2011; Taylor & Carlson, 1997).
The presence of ICs has variously been proposed to be
an early marker for psychopathology (McLewin &
Muller, 2006), a characteristic of typical development
(Taylor, Carlson, Maring, Gerow, & Charley, 2004),
and an indicator of creativity (Gleason, Jarudi, &
Cheek, 2003; Schaefer, 1969).
A number of studies have examined enhanced
creative and imaginative abilities in children with an
IC. Trionﬁ and Reese (2009) found that such children
told richer, more detailed stories and showed more
advanced narrative skills. Singer (1961) reported that,
in the context of a game, children with ICs were more
willing to wait for an extended period of time—during
which they easily entered in to imaginative play—and
also produced higher scores when marked on imagina-
tiveness of storytelling. Bouldin and Pratt (2001) found
that children with an IC were rated by parents as being
signiﬁcantly more imaginative than those who did not
have an IC, along with being more inclined to fantasy
and more likely to explain events as magical. Studies
involving adolescents have shown similar results:
Schaefer (1969) reported that, in a sample of American
high-school adolescents, students who had creative
achievements in the literary ﬁeld were more likely to
recall childhood ICs than a control group. Seiffge-
Krenke (1997) found that, among adolescents, those
who reported ICs engaged signiﬁcantly more in
imaginative activities such as day-dreaming.
In contrast to the research on children and adolescents,
relatively few studies have sought to investigate whether
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having an IC is predictive of future imaginative abilities.
Gleason et al. (2003) studied 102 female students, of
whom 29.4% reported having an IC. Participants with
an IC used signiﬁcantly more imagery, reported more
vivid night-dreams, and scored higher on a composite
imagination measure (Gleason et al., 2003). Kidd,
Rogers, and Rogers (2010) conducted two studies
focusing on whether having an IC as a child was associa-
ted with particular personality characteristics in adult-
hood. They ﬁrst reported that students who recalled
having an IC scored higher on a self-report measure of
creativity. Then, using another population of students,
they showed that those with a childhood IC scored higher
on the absorption in active imagination personality dimen-
sion (Kidd et al., 2010). Finally, Dierker, Dais, and San-
ders (1995) showed that adults who reported the presence
of an IC in childhood also scored highly on an imagin-
ation inventory and a measure of dissociative traits (such
as absorption).
Although these studies point to an advantage in
imaginative abilities for adults who had a childhood
IC, they share the limitation of only using self-report
measures of imagination, leaving their true explana-
tory value open to question. This study aimed to
build on these previous investigations by assessing
imagination using a new and more objective method-
ology: scene construction. Scene construction requires
participants to imagine and describe a number of ﬁc-
titious scenes, with the descriptions then being coded
for levels of complexity and detail (Hassabis &
Maguire, 2007). Our ﬁrst hypothesis was that parti-
cipants who reported having an IC as a child would
produce more vivid and detailed scene constructions
than those who did not.
A secondary aim was to investigate the interrelation
of ICs, imagination, and autobiographical memory.
Hassabis and Maguire (2007) argued that the psycho-
logical processes involved in memory and imagining
ﬁctitious experiences share striking similarities. Similar
brain areas are thought to underpin episodic memory,
future thinking, and imagination (Miller, 2007): Patients
with damage to the hippocampus, for example, not only
show memory impairments, but also impairments on a
future thinking and imagination task (Hassabis,
Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007). A second hypoth-
esis was that participants who produced more vivid
and detailed scene constructions would also report
richer autobiographical memories. Although previous
research connecting scene construction and memory
focused on populations with amnesia (Hassabis et al.,
2007) or schizophrenia (Raffard, D’Argembeau,
Bayard, Boulenger, & Van der Linden, 2010), this study
aimed to extend such ﬁndings to a nonclinical, young
adult population.
METHOD
Participants
The study group consisted of 60 participants (14 men).
All participants were students aged 18–23 years
(M¼ 19.9 years), and were recruited through participant
pool advertisements. A third (n¼ 20) of the sample
reported having had a childhood IC. No participant
stated that they currently had an IC.
Materials
All participants were given a questionnaire on their
imagination and memory skills. Participants had to rate
their memory and imagination ability on a 10-point scale
(1¼ poor to 10¼ very good). The questionnaire then
asked if the participant previously or currently had an
IC; if so, they were asked to provide a brief description.
The second part of the questionnaire focused on
autobiographical memory, for which participants were
asked to recall two personal happy memories: one from
their childhood and one from the past year. Happy
memories were chosen to avoid participants choosing
something upsetting that they may have not wished to
think about in substantial detail. For each memory,
the participants completed a revised version of the
Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (Johnson, Foley,
Suengas, & Raye, 1988), comprising 23 items about the
detail and vividness of the memory selected. For each
item the participants had to give a score of between 1
and 7; items included details about sensory information,
order of events, feelings, storyline, time, and accuracy.
The maximum score possible for each memory was
161. The scores for memory 1 (childhood event) and
memory 2 (event within the past year) were then
summed to produce the autobiographical memory total
(AMT) score.
The scene construction procedure was adapted from
Hassabis et al. (2007). Participants were given four cue
cards detailing the scenes they were to describe (beach,
market, museum, and forest) and a brief description of
what to include (e.g., ‘‘Imagine yourself standing by a
small stream somewhere deep in a forest. I want you
to describe the experience and the surrounding in as
much detail as possible using all your senses including
what you can see, hear, and feel.’’).
The participant’s four descriptions were transcribed
and scored separately in accordance with Hassabis
et al.’s (2007) method. Each scene was segmented into
a set of statements that were then classiﬁed as belonging
to one of four categories: spatial reference (SR), entity
presence (EP), sensory description (SD), or thought=
emotion=action (TEA). The SR category referred to
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statements regarding the relative position of entities
within the environment, directions relative to the parti-
cipant’s vantage point, or explicit measurements or
positions (e.g., ‘‘next to the trees’’ or ‘‘to my left I can
see’’). The EP category referred to any distinct entities
(e.g., objects, places, people, animals) mentioned (e.g.,
‘‘There are some stalls’’). The SD category consisted
of any statements describing (in any modality) the
properties of an entity (e.g., ‘‘the sea is very blue’’), as
well as general weather and atmosphere descriptions
(e.g., ‘‘it is very hot’’ or ‘‘it smells musty’’). Finally,
the TEA category encompassed any introspective tho-
ughts (e.g., ‘‘I wouldn’t understand’’) or emotional feel-
ings (e.g., ‘‘I feel very happy’’), as well as the thoughts,
intentions, and actions of other entities in the scene (e.g.,
‘‘my sister is swimming’’). There were no maximum or
minimum scores set; in contrast to Hassabis et al.’s
(2007) experiment, scores were not capped at 7. For
every participant, a score for each category was pro-
duced per scene and then total SR, EP, SD, and TEA
scores were calculated. Finally, a total scene construc-
tion score was calculated comprised of a count of the
total number of statements.
Procedure
Participants were all tested in a private room with only
the experimenter present. Participants completed the
questionnaire pack and then the scene construction pro-
cedure, following Hassabis et al. (2007). Brief descrip-
tions of the four scenes were read aloud one at a time.
Participants were asked to visualize the scene and
describe it in as much detail as they could, using all of
their senses. They were also told that if they were strug-
gling, they would be prompted. Cue cards detailing the
scene description and instructions were also provided.
To avoid order effects, scene presentation was counter-
balanced. All procedures were approved by a university
ethics committee.
RESULTS
Imaginary Companions and Scene Construction
As shown in Table 1, there were consistent differences
between the scene construction scores for the IC and
no-IC groups.
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA)
showed a highly signiﬁcant multivariate effect of IC sta-
tus on scene construction scores, Pillai’s Trace ¼.509,
F(4,55)¼ 14.279, p< .001, g2p ¼ :509. Group differences
were observed for all four individual categories: SR,
F(1, 58)¼ 14.32, p< 0.001, g2p ¼ :198; EP, F(1,
58)¼ 21.63, p< 0.001, g2p ¼ :272; SD, F(1,58)¼ 24.04,
p< 0.001, g2p ¼ :293; TEA, F(1, 58)¼ 29.81, p< 0.001,
g2p ¼ :339. Notably, all four components—especially
TEA—had large effect sizes as shown by partial g2
(>.198; Cohen, 1988).
To further test the idea that having an IC in child-
hood is associated with imagination in adulthood,
self-rated imagination scores for each group were com-
pared using a Mann-Whitney U-Test (used due to non-
normal outcome data). The results showed that the IC
group (median¼ 7.5, range 3–9) had signiﬁcantly higher
self-rated imagination scores than the No-IC group
(median¼ 6.0, range 2–10; U¼ 242.50, Z¼2.518,
p¼ 0.012).
IC status was unrelated to gender, v2(1)¼ 0.40,
p¼ 0.527, and there were no group differences in age, t
(58)¼0.996, p¼ 0.324.
Scene Construction and Autobiographical Memory
To assess whether those who had higher scene construc-
tion scores also scored higher on the Memory Charac-
teristics Questionnaire, the Pearson’s correlation
between total AMT score and total scene construction
score was calculated. A marginally signiﬁcant corre-
lation was found between the two (r¼ 0.25, p¼ 0.05).
However, further analysis of the data reveals that, when
the scene construction scores were separated into the
four individual components, the score for TEA was
the only remaining signiﬁcant association, carrying the
overall relationship with total scene construction score
(see Table 2).
Given the relation between autobiographical memory
and scene construction performance, it was possible that
the former could have confounded the comparison of
imagination skills between those who did and did not
report an IC. Thus, the comparison of scene construction
scores was rerun including autobiographical memory
(AMT) scores as a covariate in a MANCOVA. This
analysis produced almost identical results. In addition,
AMT scores were not related to age, r¼ 0.008,
p¼ 0.950, nor were there any group differences in
TABLE 1
Mean (Standard Deviation) Scores for Participants With and Without
an Imaginary Companion
IC No-IC P
Scene construction (total) 101.8 (21.85) 66.43 (15.71) <0.001
Spatial reference 9.85 (4.17) 6.38 (2.87) <0.001
Entity presence 35.7 (9.24) 25.15 (7.77) <0.001
Sensory description 34.05 (8.64) 24.15 (6.04) <0.001
Thought=emotion=action 22.2 (11.42) 10.25 (5.61) <0.001
Autobiographical memory
(total)
225.66 (29.23) 214.26 (28.35) 0.152
IC¼ imaginary companion.
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AMT between genders, t(58)¼ 1.382, p¼ 0.172, or
between those with and without an IC, t(58)¼ 1.45,
p¼ 0.152.
DISCUSSION
Our ﬁndings offer support for the ﬁrst hypothesis:
Compared to those not reporting a childhood IC, part-
icipants reporting an IC performed better on the scene
construction task and rated their own imagination abil-
ity more highly. Only partial support was found for the
second hypothesis, with the TEA scene construction
component being the only component to be positively
associated with AMT scores.
Childhood Imaginary Companions are Associated
With Imagination Skills in Adulthood
Seiffge-Krenke’s (1997) giftedness hypothesis proposed
that inventing a ﬁctitious character is a sign of a parti-
cularly creative and imaginative individual. Previous
research into this theory has suffered from the methodo-
logical challenges inherent in assessing childhood
imagination (Taylor, 1999). This study avoided some
such limitations by assessing imaginative abilities
through task performance rather than self-report,
conﬁrming previous ﬁndings (e.g., Gleason et al., 2003;
Kidd et al., 2010; Dierker et al., 1995) that retrospective
reports of childhood ICs are associated with
imagination competence in adulthood.
The view that childhood engagement with an IC
predicts imaginative competence in adulthood was also
supported by participants’ imagination self-rating
scores. Although only a very simple 10-point scale was
used, the IC group reliably reported themselves as being
more imaginative than their No-IC counterparts. This
result lends support to Kidd et al.’s (2010) ﬁnding that
those reporting a childhood IC rated themselves higher
on a creativity scale, and also accords with previous
research showing that those in professions concerned
with creativity and imagination (such as ﬁction writers)
report a higher percentage of childhood ICs than the
general population (Myers, 1979).
The Link Between Thought/Emotion/Action
Statements and Autobiographical Memory
Although a positive correlation between the total scene
construction score and the AMT scores was observed,
this appeared to depend solely on the TEA component
of scene construction. This interesting ﬁnding is both
contradicted and supported by previous research.
Hassabis et al.’s (2007) study found that patients with
amnesia who were impaired on the scene construction
task produced signiﬁcantly fewer statements for each
category than controls, with the largest between-group
difference existing for TEA component. This suggests
that this is the area where imagination and memory
share the most similarity, although such an explanation
is called into question by the ﬁndings of Raffard et al.
(2010), wherein the TEA component was the only cate-
gory in which individuals suffering from schizophrenia
did not score signiﬁcantly lower than controls, despite
also showing memory impairments.
An alternative explanation for these ﬁndings may,
therefore, lie in the speciﬁc method used to assess
memory. Previous explorations of the relation between
creating ﬁctitious scenes and recalling past memories
have not used self-rating instruments like the Memory
Characteristics Questionnaire. This may indicate that
our AMT scores did not reﬂect the richness of an indivi-
dual’s autobiographical memories so much as the
person’s emotional involvement with their chosen mem-
ory. Such an explanation is consistent with the known
role of emotion in encoding and retrieval (Holland &
Kensinger, 2010). This pattern of ﬁndings might then
be explained in terms of individuals who produce more
TEA statements being more naturally inclined to relate
to the emotional content of a scene. Consequently, indi-
viduals may also be more likely to report higher ratings
on the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire where
several of the scales are related to personal thoughts
and feelings about memories (for example, the extent
to which the storyline of the memory narrative is bizarre
or realistic, or to which personal feelings about the
memory are very intense or not intense).
Autobiographical Memory and Scene Construction
do not Correlate Strongly in a Student Population
The lack of a relationship between AMT and other
components of scene construction contradicts previous
ﬁndings (Raffard et al., 2010; Hassabis et al., 2007).
The most likely explanation for this can be found in
the composition of the population used in this sample.
Previous research in this area has involved participants
with some form of memory impairment or deterioration
through amnesia, schizophrenia, autism, or old age.
This may mean that imagination and memory do,
TABLE 2
Pearson’s Correlations Between Scene Construction Scores and
Autobiographical Memory
r p
Scene construction (total) 0.24 0.050
Spatial reference 0.17 0.189
Entity presence 0.26 0.263
Sensory description 0.07 0.580
Thought=emotion=action 0.37 0.004
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indeed, draw on a similar network of brain regions, but
this may only have a bearing upon an individual’s fun-
damental cognitive ability to produce scenes and recall
memories, rather than on the level of detail and richness
that they provide. This explanation is supported by
Szpunar and McDermott’s (2008) argument that the
strong connection between imagining the future and
remembering the past is evident in certain populations
that lack access to speciﬁc details of their past that are
necessary to mentally construct future scenes. In a typi-
cal young adult population, such access is unlikely to be
restricted, suggesting that scene construction com-
petence will be determined by individual differences,
nondevelopmental experiential factors, and an indivi-
dual’s environment, as opposed to their neurological
functioning. To give an example, those who are nat-
urally more descriptive in the scene construction task
may be avid readers of ﬁction, helping them to construct
a rich scene, but not necessarily making them more
likely to remember past events in greater detail.
Limitations and Future Research
Several study limitations require consideration. First,
although age was not a statistically signiﬁcant con-
founding variable, this may be because the sample only
consisted of students aged 18–23 years. The nature of
retrospective reports of ICs means that younger parti-
cipants may be more likely to remember having an IC.
Future research should utilize larger samples of more
diverse ages to determine how stable imagination really
is across the lifespan.
Second, deﬁning childhood imagination in terms of
IC engagement is open to criticism. Taylor (1999)
argued that having an IC as a child is by no means
the only way that children express their imagination,
and some highly imaginative children do not engage in
such play. However, as this was a retrospective study,
there were few alternative ways of assessing childhood
imagination. Additionally, the scene construction pro-
cedure relies heavily upon verbal ability, and although
the sample used was composed of students educated to
a similar level, individual verbal ability may have acted
as a confounding variable. This study did not control for
language ability or selective language problems, and
hence some participants might have been disadvantaged
by the choice of methodology.
Limitations also surround how autobiographical
memory was measured, mainly because self-rating mea-
sures are unavoidably—and by deﬁnition—subjective.
Some participants may have been more prone to rating
their memories more highly on the scales. The relative
weakness of this measure may, in part, explain the lim-
ited association between memory and scene construction
found here. Finally, both the memory and imagination
tasks relied on single-item measures, and the present
ﬁndings should ideally be replicated with multiple
measures of each capacity.
Future research in this area would, therefore, beneﬁt
from utilizing different indices of imagination and
autobiographical memory. A potential way of investi-
gating the validity of scene construction as an assess-
ment of imagination could be by comparing it with
performance on a nonverbal measure such as a test of
creative imagination (e.g., Karwowski, 2008), which
would also remove the potential confound of verbal abil-
ity. In addition, a limitation of the scene construction
task is that it invites descriptions of physical scenes that
do not necessarily have a social component. Future adap-
tations of the task could include speciﬁcally social scenar-
ios, such as imagining saying goodbye to a loved one (see
also Hassabis et al., 2014). This would, in turn, illuminate
the role of internalized social models in imagination more
generally, and speciﬁcally in the generation of representa-
tions of nonactual social agents that occurs in engage-
ment with ICs (Davis, Meins, & Fernyhough, 2014),
and in less typical experiences such as auditory verbal
hallucinations (Wilkinson & Bell, in press).
More research is also needed into the relation between
imagination and memory in a typical young adult popu-
lation. First, one might compare scene construction per-
formance and performance on a nonself-rated measure
of autobiographical memory. Second, building on pre-
vious research with individuals affected by memory
impairments, neuroimaging studies with typical adults
could be used to determine and differentiate neural areas
activated when performing imagination and memory
tasks. Studies such as these promise to shed further light
on the intriguing developmental relations among creativ-
ity, imagination, and memory.
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